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CURRENT LEGISLATION
OUTLAWED MORTGAGES AND VENDORS' LIENS-AMENDMENT TO
REAL PROPERTY LAW PERMITTING CANCELLATION AS OF RECORD.-
At the session of the legislature concluded on March 13th last, a
further amendment to Section 500 of the Real Property Law 1 was
made which is noteworthy from a dual aspect. Aside from the fact
that the amendment is extremely beneficial to certain property
owners, it is also interesting for the further inroads it makes on the
ancient and austere rules of equity jurisprudence. Of course, in the
constant development of the law throughout the years, many old es-
tablished doctrines have given way to more modern and useful rules,
dictated perhaps by economic necessity. However, each change, each
development, is worthy of particular observation and comment be-
cause of its historical enrichment.
The amendment in question adds subdivision 4 to Section 500
of the Real Property Law and provides, in substance, that where
an action to foreclose a mortgage or to enforce a vendor's lien is
barred by the statute of limitations, any person having an interest
or estate in the real property affected, may institute an action to
cancel the encumbrance of record as a cloud on title.2 As a result
of this statute real property which may have been subject to either
of the enumerated encumbrances will now be more readily salable.
The statute removes a serious obstacle facing a vendor who must
satisfy his vendee that he has a marketable title to convey, and con-
sequently the amendment tends to reduce litigation.
I Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 105.
2 The full text of the amendment is as follows: "Where the period al-
lowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action
to foreclose a mortgage, or to enforce a vendor's lien, has expired any person
having an estate or interest in the real property subject to such encumbrance
may maintain an action against any other person or persons, known or un-
known, including one under disability as hereinafter specified, to secure the
cancellation and discharge of record of such encumbrance, and to adjudge the
estate or interest of the plaintiff in such real property to be free therefrom;
provided, however, that no such action shall be maintainable in any case where
the mortgagee, holder of the vendor's lien, or the successor of either of them
shall be in possession of the affected real property at the time of the com-
mencement of the action. In any action brought under this section it shall
be immaterial whether the debt upon which the mortgage or lien was based
has, or has not, been paid; and also whether the mortgage in question was, or
was not, given to secure a part of the purchase price.
"The interest had by any mortgagee or contract vendee of real property
or by any successor in interest of either of them, is an 'interest in real property'
as that phrase is used in this article of the real property law."
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To understand the full significance of this amendment it is neces-
sary to consider briefly Section 500 as a whole and also its historical
development. The section is derived from Section 1638 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which in turn had its antecedents in qualified
form in the Revised Statutes.3
Prior to the enactment of these statutes the methods of deter-
mining adverse claims to real property and removing clouds on title
were by bills in equity known as hills of peace, and bills qu14 timet
There was an essential distinction between the remedies afforded by
these two ancient bills. The bill of peace was originally formulated
by the court of chancery for the purpose of avoiding multiplicity of
suits.4 A development of the bill of peace used early in the law
concerning real property was the bill to quiet title which was insti-
tuted to put finally at rest the claim of title of the adverse claimant
and thereby put a stop to vexatious litigation. On the other hand,
the bill quid timet was instituted for the purpose of removing clouds
on title by compelling the adverse claimant to deliver up for can-
cellation the instrument under which he claimed, or to release the
land from an encumbrance or lien. With respect to the cancellation
of an instrument as a cloud on title, the rule was established at an
early time that equity would only interfere when the instrument ap-
peared valid on its face and extrinsic evidence was necessary to show
the invalidity.5 The reason advanced by the courts for so holding
was that only those instruments which appeared to be valid would
mislead the public and that those patently invalid would not be relied
upon. Thus if the instrument were a mortgage and it appeared in-
valid on its face by reason of the statute of limitations, equity decreed
that no interference was necessary 6 since this was merely a pur-
ported claim which no one could question.
This stringent and often criticized 7 rule was not confined to
actions involving clouds on real property titles but was likewise fol-
lowed where other instruments, such as promissory notes, were ques-
tioned as to their validity.8 In such cases the courts held that no
necessity existed for affirmative relief as there was a perfect defense
at law.9
3N. Y. LAw REVISION CommIssoIo REPORT, Lzmis. Doc. No. 65(G)
(1943).
4 1 PomERoY, EQurTY JuisPRUDENucE § 246 (5th ed. 1941).
5 Cox v. Clift, 2 N. Y. 118 (1848).6 Capell v. Dill, 82 Kan. 652, 109 Pac. 286 (1910) ; Gibson v. Johnson, 73
Kan. 261, 84 Pac. 982 (1906); cf. Hall v. City of Lockport, 90 Misc. 429, 153
N. Y. Supp. 298 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
7 4 PomEnoy, EQUITY JuRisPRuDNCz § 1399 (5th ed. 1941); Finnegan,
Problem and Procedure in Quiet Title Actions, 26 Nm L. Rzv. 485 (1947).8 Allerton v. Belden, 49 N. Y. 373 (1872).
9 Allerton v. Belden, 49 N. Y. 373 (1872); Minturn v. Farmers Loan &
Trust Co., 3 N. Y. 498 (1850).
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Ultimately, many of the states enacted statutes with respect to
real property which codified the remedies afforded by the existing
law and in many respects extended and liberalized the powers of the
courts to quiet title.' 0 In New York, after several statutory devel-
opments, Article 15 of the Real Property Law was adopted in 1920.
Section 500 of this article enumerated the instances in which dis-
puted claims to real property could be determined. Section 507 ",
provided that the court could order any instrument purporting to
create an interest, lien or encumbrance to be delivered up and can-
celled. However, in spite of the broad sweep of the statutory lan-
guage, the remedy was still subject to many of the limitations orig-
inally placed on such proceedings as laid down by the courts of equity.
One of the most important limitations was that the party seeking a
determination had to be in possession of the property. The rationale
being that if the party were in possession his remedy at law was in-
adequate since in order to maintain ejectment at law he would have
to be out of possession; therefore equity came to his aid. The statu-
tory proceeding as then constituted continued this tenuous and in-
equitable condition.
In 1943 the statutory remedy was radically overhauled at the
instance of the Law Revision Commission.12 The requirement of
possession was eliminated and the availability of the remedy was ex-
tended to those having an interest in land whereas previously only
those having an estate in land could sue.
However, the amendment most pertinent to the present inquiry
was the addition of subdivision 2 to Section 500 which reads as
follows : "Such action may be maintained, even though the defen-
dant's claim appears to be invalid on its face, or the court may have
to determine the death of a person, or any statutory limitation of
time, or any question of fact or law upon which an adjudication of
the adverse claims of the parties may depend."
Thus for the first time it appeared that statutory machinery was
available to determine claims based on instruments which were in-
valid on their face. This was, indeed, a substantial deviation from
the long established equitable practice. But the fact that it was neces-
sary for the legislature in 1948 to enact the amendment under con-
sideration is proof that the hope of the statutory revisors was not
entirely fulfilled. By virtue of the amendment the courts are now
expressly empowered to cancel and discharge of record a mortgage
which has been barred by the statute of limitations. Why, then, did
not the 1943 revision as quoted above apply to such a situation? The
20 See Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314, 323, 39 L. ed. 167, 172 (1894) ;
Finnegan, Problems and Procedure in Quiet Title Actions, 26 NEB. L. Rav. 485
(1947).
11 Now § 506 of Article 15.
2 2 N. Y. LAw REVIsIoN CommIssios REPORT, LEais. Doc. No. 65(G)
(1943).
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answer simply is that the statutory proceeding is still imbued with
equitable principles which dictate the result to be attained when the
particular case shows that an injustice would otherwise occur. It
has been aptly stated in a recent case that the statute has merely
codified the remedies obtained through the bill of peace and the bill
quia timet.13
Unaffected by the statute, therefore, was the firmly established
rule that when a party comes into equity seeking affirmative relief,
he must himself do equity. Therefore, one who goes into equity to
ask that a mortgage which is barred by the statute of limitations be
declared a cloud on title and that it be cancelled of record, is in-
variably reminded that the statute of limitations is a shield and not
a sword.14 His prayer for relief is thus denied unless he does equity
himself and pays the debt due under the mortgage. This principle
was reiterated as late as March, 1947, in the case of Beach 102d
Street Realty Corp. v. Ringel.r5  There the plaintiff relied on the
legal presumption of payment of a mortgage by reason of the running
of the statute of limitations and prayed that the court decree that
the mortgage be cancelled of record as a cloud on title. The court
held that the plaintiff could not so employ the statute of limitations
and that to be entitled to affirmative relief the debt would first have
to be paid.' 6
It would appear, therefore, that in spite of the language of Sec-
tion 500 as revised in 1943, in order to implement the statute, with
respect to cancellation of patently invalid instruments, the plaintiff
would have to show special equities in his favor, such as payment
of the mortgage, in order to obtain the desired relief. Thus the law
was not as favorable to the property owner as originally contem-
plated and the net result of these decisions was to retain substan-
tially the rules of law formerly in force prior to the revision of 1943.
Perhaps such a condition would not be too inequitable between
the original parties to the mortgage since in all fairness the mortgagor
should return the money he received from the mortgagee in good
faith. But it seems that one who holds an outlawed mortgage may
nevertheless be possessed of a substantial remedy which he can avail
himself of not only against the original mortgagor but also against
subsequent purchasers of the real property covered by the mortgage
and thereby defeat the very purpose of the statute of limitations.
Many of these outlawed mortgages contain an express power of sale
's Karp v. Twenty Three Thirty Ryer Corp., 185 Misc. 440, 56 N. Y. S. 2d
783 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
14 Johnson v. Albany & Susquehanna K R., 54 N. Y. 416 (1873) ; Morey
v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 14 N. Y. 302 (1856).
is 190 Misc. 199, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1947); accord, Wanger
v. U. S. Trust Co., 190 Misc. 73, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
16 It is specifically provided by the amendment under consideration that it
is immaterial whether the debt upon which the mortgage or lien was based has,
or has not, been paid.
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and it has been held by the Court of Appeals in the case of House v.
Carr'7 that where the mortgage debt is unpaid, such a power of sale
in an outlawed mortgage may be exercised through the medium of
foreclosure by advertisement. Under this method of foreclosure the
property may be sold upon a default without any recourse to the
courts. The power of sale is deemed a private agreement which may
be exercised upon the happening, of the condition which makes it op-
erative."' The rule is that the running of the statute of limitations
does not discharge the debt but only destroys the particular remedy
to collect the debt, and if another remedy exists which is unaffected
by the bar of the statute the mortgagee may enforce his debt in that
manner.19 Thus it seems that although the statute of limitations is
intended as a statute of repose and a just penalty for one who is
dilatory, the assurance that the statute should offer of an unimpeach-
able title by reason of the passage of time has not been attained. It
is one thing to hold that the mortgagor must do equity and pay the
debt if he desires affirmative relief and thus place the parties in
statu quo; but it is quite another to allow the mortgagee who has
been dilatory to obtain the exact relief which appeared to have been
barred, through another means of recovery.
Moreover, there has been a line of cases which has further in-
creased the instability of the overall picture by reason of the holdings
in these cases that where the mortgage is barred by the statute of
limitations the owner of the property, nevertheless, has a marketable
title and can convey with impunity.20 Indeed, it has been held that
a vendee under a contract of sale must accept a conveyance under
these conditions.21 This is undesirable, to say the least, as it places
the vendee in a very precarious position. Having purchased the
property in good faith he should not be subjected to the possibility
of losing it at the instance of the outlawed mortgagee.
The injustice of the entire situation has been succinctly summed
up by Judge Mitchell in his forcible dissenting opinion in the case of
Maloney v. Finnegan 22 as follows: "Every business man knows that
an instrument may be so serious a cloud that no lawyer would pass
the title, and no man buy the property, and yet a court, after grave
deliberation, might hold that the instrument was void on its face, and,
.7 185 N. Y. 453, 78 N. E. 171 (1906).
18 Elliott v. Wood, 45 N. Y. 71 (1871). The mechanics of the sale itself
are regulated in New York by Article 17 of the Real Property Law.
29 House v. Carr, 185 N. Y. 453, 78 N. E. 171 (1906) ; Kelley v. Hall, 144
Misc. 759, 259 N. Y, Supp. 383 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
20 Ouvrier v. Mahon, 117 App. Div. 749, 102 N. Y. Supp. 981 (2d Dep't
1907); Paget v. Melcher, 42 App. Div. 76, 58 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1st Dep't
1899); Inr re Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., - Misc. -, 69 N. Y. S. 2d
564 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
21 In re Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., - Misc. -, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 564
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
2238 Minn. 70, 35 N. W. 723 (1887).
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then, perhaps it would be void only because the court said so. To
allow a defendant to commit legal suicide by urging that the instru-
ment under which he claims is void, and for the court to hold on
that ground that the plaintiff needs no relief, although his title is
seriously clouded in fact, is neither just nor reasonable." 23
It is evident, therefore, that the amendment to Section 500
which has just been enacted was not only desirable but necessary in
order that the uncertainties and inequities which are now prevalent,
might be finally resolved.
The procedure available under the new amendment is also ap-
plicable to outlawed vendors' liens as the problems inherent in such
liens are analogous to those presented by outlawed mortgages.24 The
vendor's lien contemplated by this statute is the lien implied by law
in favor of a vendor who has conveyed without taking security for
the purchase price and also the lien which is expressly reserved by
contract but which has not been raised to the dignity of a mortgage.20
The statute also provides that the interest of any mortgagee is
an "interest in real property," as that phrase is used in the statutory
proceeding and thus the remedy of cancellation is made available to
a junior mortgagee whose mortgage might become a first lien upon
cancellation of the outlawed mortgage. The remedy is also available
to a contract vendee who has not as yet taken a conveyance as the
statute likewise defines the interest of a contract vendee as an
"interest in real property." 26
HAROLD E. COLLINS.
AMENDMENT TO THE STOCK CORPORATION LAW RELATING TO
CERTIFICATES OF INCORPORATION REQUIRING MORE THAN STATU-
TORY MAJORITY FOR CORPORATE AcTIoN.-Effective September 1,
1948, the Stock Corporation Law has been amended by inserting a
new section to be Section 9.1 The amendment permits certificates
of incorporation to include therein provisions requiring more than a
statutory majority or plurality for a quorum vote or consent of di-
rectors or shareholders. Four specific limitations are placed upon
certificates of incorporation requiring mor& than the statutory ma-
jority. No such requirement will be deemed valid unless (1) it ap-
pears in the certificate as originally filed or as originally amended;
2338 Minn. 70, 71, 72, 35 N. W. 723, 724, 725 (1887).24 N. Y. LAW REVISION CommIssioN RF.PORT, LEGiS. Doc. No. 65(N)
(1948).
25 Franklin Savings Bank v. Ascension Memorial Church, - Misc. -, 55
N. Y. S. 2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
26N. Y. LAW REviSION COMMISSION REPrmT. LEGis. Doc. No. 65(N)
(1948).
1 Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 862.
1948 ]
